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Abstract 
This study presents a systematic review of research using social network analysis to document the structure of 
organized crime groups involved in drug trafficking. Our first objective is to determine whether the balance of 
evidence supports the argument that organized crime groups are loosely structured. Second, we aim to assess the 
relative importance of targeting individuals high in social capital (structural position) versus human capital (access to 
resources) in efforts to disrupt operations. Examining 34 studies, describing 54 illicit drug supply networks, we find 
five implications for anti-drug policy, and propose seven recommendations to facilitate meta-analysis and improve 
cross-network comparison.
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Background
Qualitative research examining organized crime groups, 
with an emphasis on drug trafficking activity, finds vary-
ing group structure within a loosely connected trade net-
work. While these assessments are useful, there is little 
consistency in how authors operationalize organizational 
forms (as noted by Dorn et  al. 2005), in part because 
these analyses are unable to map the actual structure of 
the group. Deepening our understanding of how illicit 
drug markets operate is pivotal to designing effective 
policy and crime control strategies. If structure varies, 
perhaps by market niche, drug trafficked or group char-
acteristics, then we must tailor crime control efforts so 
they target the vulnerabilities of specific types of opera-
tions. Structure matters.
To standardize our descriptions of criminal group 
structures and begin the process of verifying the sup-
positions generated by qualitative research, scholars 
are turning to social network analysis (SNA). Capital-
izing on a suite of empirical tools—theory, metrics, and 
analytics—crime scientists use SNA to document the 
interdependence among actors involved in drug traf-
ficking. Rather than describing a group in general terms 
using researcher generated typologies, SNA studies use 
common metrics to characterize group structure, pin-
point specific actors and groups that control key market 
activities, i.e., importing drugs, laundering proceeds, etc., 
and identify individuals positioned to reestablish trade 
activity when central figures are removed. Thus, SNA 
provides an opportunity to re-examine what we think we 
know about market structure from a fresh perspective.
Examining SNA research of drug trafficking organi-
zations, this systematic review of 34 published studies, 
describing 55 trade networks, is the first to synthesize 
what we currently know about the structure of illicit 
drug trade. We begin with a brief overview of landmark 
qualitative research and describe how SNA can contrib-
ute to the study of the organizational structure of crime 
groups. Then, we outline our document search proto-
col, and detail our methods. The results are partitioned 
into two sections. First, we examine network structure 
and find evidence confirming the idea that groups and 
drug markets are loosely organized and that groups have 
identifiable central figures. Second, we consider the rela-
tive importance of social capital (e.g. network position) 
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and human capital (e.g. access to resources), confirming 
a correlation between social and human capital and that 
network vulnerabilities, representing key persons, are 
identifiable. We conclude with a discussion of the impli-
cations these findings have for crime control policy and 
provide direction for future research to facilitate meta-
analyses and improve cross-network comparison.
Structure of drug trafficking groups
Group structure
Contrary to media inspired conceptualizations of organ-
ized crime, qualitative research investigating the con-
figuration of drug trafficking organizations finds varying 
group structures within a loosely connected trade net-
work (for a review of some of this literature see Natarajan 
and Hough 2000). While a thorough review of the field is 
beyond the scope of the present study, a number of semi-
nal research projects inform hypotheses about the struc-
ture of groups involved in illicit drug markets.
Adler (1985) showed early on that organized crime 
groups tend to operate similar to legitimate business. 
Using ethnographic methods, she revealed that drug traf-
ficking operations are loosely structured, often involving 
informal agreements among market participants. Argu-
ing that market structure is to some extent dependent 
upon the source of the drug handled; the specialized 
importation of foreign drugs requires fewer people and 
less formal structure than domestic drug production. 
Domestic drug production is also more likely to mimic a 
legitimate organization due to local competition.
Interviewing 40 incarcerated high-level cocaine and 
marijuana traffickers, Reuter and Haaga (1989) discov-
ered that their networks typically take the form of small 
partnerships consisting of temporary and dynamic coa-
litions of dealers. Acknowledging methodological limita-
tions associated with the sample, Reuter and Haaga make 
several key observations about the markers of ‘success’ 
in the industry that are of relevance to the present study. 
(1) There are few barriers to getting involved in the mar-
ket; namely, access to capital, effort, luck, and use of vio-
lence are not required for success. (2) Traffickers are not 
limited to working regionally—the market is national. 
In the wholesale market, experience and the willing-
ness to make and take opportunities limits involvement. 
(3) Large or long lasting networks exist, but they are not 
required for success in high-level drug operations.
To this point, Eck and Gersh (2000) examined 620 cases 
gathered from federal, state, and local drug investigations 
in the Washington-Baltimore High Drug Trafficking area 
(W/B HIDTA) from 1995 to 1997. The results show that 
60.4% of cases involved individuals or actors conspir-
ing with a loose-knit association. Further, of the 39.1% 
involved in some form of a criminal organization, most 
(66.7%) comprised groups of less than 21 people. After 
studying operations in greater detail (e.g., communica-
tions patterns, transactions, and security), the authors 
conclude that drug trafficking more closely resembled a 
cottage industry of small, somewhat temporary sets of 
people, and that there were few instances of large, hierar-
chically-organized distribution networks.
Qualitative studies of drug operations trafficking crack, 
cocaine, and heroin throughout the 1990s and 2000s 
found similar results. For instance, Dorn et  al. (2005) 
reviewed upper-level drug trafficking literature, conclud-
ing that drug traffickers are diverse and driven by differ-
ent motivations. These differences are reflected in group 
structure and vulnerability: business criminals motivated 
by profit are more likely to have a durable core with sev-
eral connections to different groups and individuals than 
ideologically motivated offenders (Dorn et  al. 2005). 
In his interviews with Colombian, drug cartel inform-
ants, Kenney (2007) shows that trafficking networks are 
flexible and react to opportunities and constraints by 
expanding and contracting in size and reach. Research 
by Spapens (2010, 2011) also supports these findings. 
He shows that drug market monopolies are rare and dif-
ficult to maintain. He highlights the differences between 
legitimate and criminal markets, focusing on the need for 
trust in illicit business.
This literature led to the following working hypoth-
esis: while several structures exist, most operations are 
loosely connected networks that can quickly react to shift-
ing market conditions. What is not clear from this body 
of work, however, is whether mapped networks exhibit 
loose connectivity and to what extent this structure per-
tains to specific, clearly defined groups of actors, and to 
what extent these patterns characterize general market 
structure. A key issue in understanding the form and 
function of a network is to establish membership bound-
aries, because including peripheral individuals who are 
not really part of the group can significantly alter how 
we describe the network. A dense, cohesive group with 
a single leader will appear to look like a loosely con-
nected set of clusters if people linking groups together 
are also included. Thus, it is important to consider group 
structure (within a definable crime group) and market 
structure (connections between different groups in a dis-
tribution chain) independently—it is possible that within 
group structure can be hierarchical even when the mar-
ket as a whole exhibits the properties of a loosely con-
nected network. Moreover, with each author developing 
their own typology of group structure it is difficult to 
conduct the cross-study comparisons needed to estab-
lish general patterns. Standardized metrics are needed 
to describe the nature and distribution of organizational 
structures.
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Role differentiation
The importance of role differentiation by activity (i.e., 
fetching precursor drugs versus cooking methampheta-
mine) or market niche (i.e., cross-border smuggling ver-
sus wholesale supplying) also emerges from the review of 
qualitative research. Variation in organizational structure 
means that disruption efforts will need to be tailored to 
the type of operation and the inherent resilience of the 
group structure. For instance, through extensive inter-
viewing of 296 subjects involved in crack, cocaine, and 
heroin distributions, Johnson et al. (2000) found evidence 
of role differentiation in response to police attention: 
countermoves involved parsing drug market activities 
into specific tasks, (e.g., separating holders, transporters, 
deliverers, money counters, versus guards, etc.) in order 
to be flexible and resilient to crime suppression activities. 
Their research also uncovered that market niches, such 
as low-level distribution, dealing, and upper-level distri-
bution, show variation in organizational structure. This 
suggests that market forces at each level of trade impose 
unique constraints upon individuals engaged in drug 
trafficking.
Even within money laundering, a function we gener-
ally recognize as a relatively specialized facet of drug traf-
ficking, we find evidence of the varied, and thus flexible, 
nature of operations (Schneider 2010; Soudijn 2012). For 
example, studying 31 Dutch cases involving large-scale 
cocaine importation, Soudijn (2014) discovered that only 
half of the investigations (14 cases) involved people pro-
viding financial services typically associated with money 
laundering. Contrary to conventional wisdom, however, 
the study uncovered a wide range of financial activity and 
financial facilitators were not accountants or lawyers; 
rather, individuals were involved in either sending money 
between countries (e.g., smuggling cash and hawala 
banking) or they participated in activities to give money 
a legal appearance, such as investing in the legal econ-
omy. Though not commented on by Soudijn (2014), this 
suggests human capital—individual resources and skill 
sets—influences whether, and in what capacity, someone 
is involved in drug market activities. Human capital may 
also differentiate leaders and critical personnel from easy 
to replace subordinates.
More recently, Natarajan et  al. (2015) examined 89 
organizations uncovered through major investigations 
of the Drug Enforcement Administration (50 cases con-
stituted the nation-wide sample) or prosecuted in New 
York City (39 cases) from 1997 to 2007 with the aim of 
testing a system of classifying groups along two dimen-
sions—organizational structure and tasks. Most notably, 
they find that data source impacts structural variation. 
For instance, when using New York City data, 12.8% of 
groups have a corporate organizational style and 30.1% 
were communal businesses, whereas, federal cases 
tended to involve corporate (54%) or communal busi-
nesses (42%). Where corporate organizational style 
includes a formal hierarchy and division of labor and 
communal businesses are comprised of members linked 
by at least one common characteristic, i.e., religion, 
nationality, neighborhood, or race. Additionally, 41% 
of New York cases and 62% of federal cases concerned 
groups involved in multiple niches (e.g., smuggling, 
wholesale, and regional distribution). Again, having a 
flexible, informal structure and being involved in a range 
of activities speaks to the potential impact that the col-
lective resources and individual human capital play in 
shaping operational structure.
These studies suggest that drug trafficking is comprised 
of entrepreneurs exploiting their social and human capi-
tal. Our second working hypothesis follows from this 
idea. The hypothesis states, varying structural properties 
emerge for different types of market involvement and that 
market leaders and critical personnel (central individu-
als) are those with the greatest human capital. Soudijn 
(2014) and Natarajan et al. (2015), however, raise the con-
cern that what we think we know about organizational 
structure is to a large part, pre-determined by the focus 
of and resources deployed during investigations, as well 
as the prosecutorial discretion of attorneys at the local 
and federal levels. Thus, we may find that variation in the 
predominance of central individuals is contingent on the 
scope of the study and source of information.
Network analysis of trafficking networks
While SNA-oriented study of organized crime is rela-
tively new, the material advantage of using network sci-
ence to study criminal organizations was lauded over 
two decades ago [see for example Jackson et  al. (1996) 
and Sparrow (1991)]. Because we are still in a relatively 
nascent stage of development, crime scientists are still 
working through SNA theory and metrics to identify the 
most appropriate mechanisms to test our ideas about 
the structure of crime groups. With this caveat in mind, 
two themes dominate our efforts to map the structure of 
illicit drug trafficking.
Criminal network structures
Crime scientists working with SNA have come to view 
criminal networks differently from other social net-
works because they operate in hostile environments. For 
instance, Morselli writes, “Criminal networks are not 
simply social networks operating in a criminal context. 
The covert settings that surround them call for specific 
interactions and relational features within and beyond 
the network (2009; 8).” With various agents of the crim-
inal justice system working to constrain illicit trade, 
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individuals profiting from criminal enterprise must work 
in secrecy, under a cloak of invisibility; whereas, legiti-
mate trade activity may organize to maximize the effi-
ciency of operations. This ongoing challenge shapes how 
the group, and overall market, operates. As stated in our 
first working hypothesis, qualitative investigations sug-
gest that drug operations are primarily loosely connected 
networks capable of rapid change in response to shifting 
market conditions. While direct SNA metrics of these 
concepts do not exist, we can explore comparable con-
cepts of network density (or sparseness) and centrality, 
and what this means for operational structure.
Figure  1 illustrates the difference between dense and 
sparse operations and introduces two types of central 
positioning—hubs and brokers [(see Borgatti and Ever-
ett 1992, 2006) or  for a more information about net-
work centrality and associated metrics visit https://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Centrality or http://www.faculty.
ucr.edu/~hanneman/nettext/C10_Centrality.html]. This 
begins our discussion of how operational structures may 
indicate a preference for efficiency or secrecy (security). 
Note that in this hypothetical example, the circles repre-
sent people involved in the manufacture and trafficking 
of methamphetamine and the arrowheads indicate the 
flow of communications through the network.
If we look at person 6, denoted by a grey circle, in 
Fig. 1a, we see their position in the network allows them 
to exchange information with most others in the net-
work. This information exchange is efficient and may be 
quick as there are few intermediaries required to reach 
other group members. In this example, density is high, 
meaning that most people connect directly to each other. 
Higher network density positively effects the network’s 
efficiency, provided messages take direct paths through 
the network. Arguably, this structure may also increase 
trust among individuals in the network [see Coleman 
(1988) and Granovetter (1981) for more details on trust 
and network closure]. An additional benefit is that with 
the removal of any individual, the group would continue 
to function: it is highly resilient to attack because of its 
high level of interconnectivity. While more efficient and 
resilient to attack, the structure reduces operational 
security. This means the network is not “secure” against 
efforts by law enforcement to uncover information about 
operations. For example, if we arrest person 6, or anyone 
else for that matter, they have knowledge of all group 
members and could implicate everyone in an investiga-
tion. Compare this network structure to Fig.  1b; here, 
we see that if person 6 were to act as an informant, they 
could only implicate the person they receive information 
from, person 3, and the person they transmit information 
to, person 8. The network is relatively secure, because it 
is sparse and few connections exist among people in the 
group. The drawback is that rebuilding operations can be 
lengthy and difficult when crime control efforts remove a 
centrally placed individual.
Sparse, or loosely connected networks, typically 
include individuals centrally positioned as hubs and 
brokers. Individuals with a lot of direct connections 
(such as person 3 in Fig.  1b), relative to others in the 
network, are hubs. Theoretically, we consider hubs to 
have the greatest degree of influence in the network; 
they can directly share information with more peo-
ple than anyone else can. Brokerage is a different idea 
about central positioning—brokerage positions enable 
someone to control the flow of information between any 
randomly selected pair of other actors in the network. 
Returning to Fig.  1a, since any effort to communicate 
with person 1 or 2 must go through person 3, person 
3 is in a better position to broker information within 
the group. These structural positions offer a strategic 
advantage for crime control when networks are sparse: 
disruption efforts that aim to remove central actors, 
namely hubs and brokers, stand the greatest chance to 
disrupt network functions.
Social and human capital
Another social network argument is that individuals 
positioned with ties to unique clusters of people have 
greater social capital (Burt 1992, 1997). Bridging differ-
ent groups of people has a strategic advantage; individu-
als become indispensable to the overall group because 
they alone “hold” the group together and they ensure 
that they are the first to hear new information as it passes 
through the network. When combined with human Fig. 1 Network structures characterizing security and efficiency
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capital, that is having unique skills or access to resources, 
a well-equipped bridge has great potential to maximize 
their success. When applied to organized crime groups 
and drug markets, we may hypothesize that varying 
structural properties emerge for different types of mar-
ket involvement. Owing to the idea that some activities 
are more important to operations (e.g., money launder-
ing and smuggling) and that, market leaders and critical 
personnel (central individuals within a group or connect-
ing different groups) are those with the greatest human 
capital.
As illustrated in Fig.  2a, individuals 3 and 6 have 
equivalent social capital. They each have efficient con-
nections, meaning they established a single relation 
with each of three different clusters of people. Since the 
clusters do not have other connections joining them 
to the other groups of people, individuals 3 and 6 have 
unique positions. Sitting between several subgroups, 
they have the opportunity to reap the most benefit from 
the information they access from each cluster. This net-
work position presents opportunities to use or act on 
information first and may serve to enhance the suc-
cess of persons 3 and 6. In doing so, their actions may 
enhance the overall success of the entire network. Nota-
bly, if we factor for the ability to act on this informa-
tion, meaning that we consider the individual attributes 
and resources of each person, we may discover that 
despite having similar social capital, person 3 (the meth 
cook as indicated in panel b), has greater human capi-
tal, and so, may be better able to use their social capital 
to their advantage. The argument being, couriers have a 
less specialized skillset making person 6 easy to replace, 
whereas with greater individual resources, the meth 
cook would be harder to substitute. In this scenario, 
positional advantage is not sufficient; it is only when the 
information benefit accrued from social position inter-
sects with human capital that material advantages are 
likely realized.
Present study
Adapting the working hypotheses derived from qualita-
tive research to fit within an SNA framework, we sought 
to answer two sets of questions.
1. Does the SNA literature identify specific network 
structures common to drug trafficking organiza-
tions that are consistent with the findings of quali-
tative research? If so, is there a difference between 
group structures and market structures? Moreover, 
given methodological shortcomings, what strategic 
implications can we derive from these findings to aid 
crime control efforts aimed at disrupting drug trade?
Fig. 2 Network structures characterizing social and human capital
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2. What is the relative importance of social capital 
(position within the network) and human capital 
(access to unique resources and skills) in determining 
who are the critical actors or groups within an illicit 
drug market? By using such information, do crime 
control efforts gain an advantage in efforts to dis-
rupt market activity? Do the methodological short-




To ensure our search protocol was systematic, thor-
ough, and efficient (fewest number of false positives), 
we identified an optimal set of search terms through an 
iterative process using a notable hit weight selection cri-
terion.1 To calculate the notable hit weight for each set 
of possible search terms we divided the number of arti-
cles found on Google Scholar written by notable 
authors2 by the total number of matches identified. We 
assume that a search term or phrase that returns a high 
yield of materials produced by known, active scholars in 
the field will likely be more effective in uncovering simi-
lar types of research produced by other authors with a 
smaller body of work. Starting with a preliminary set of 
potential terms,3 drawn from the keywords listed in 
articles written by notable authors, we systematically 
removed all poorly preforming items. For instance, we 
removed the search term “co-offending” because it gen-
erated too many false positives—few articles pertained 
to drug trafficking networks. As reported in Table 1, this 
process resulted in six best preforming sets of key-
words. Next, we tested various keyword combinations 
to build an optimal set of terms, settling on “Illicit drug 
network structure analysis trafficking” + “network anal-
ysis” which achieved a notable hit rate of 90:1,560, a 
value that was 2.8 standard deviations above the mean 
of all other tests.4
1 As aptly pointed out by one of the reviewers, systematic reviews are typi-
cally inefficient, partly to ensure that the search uncovers the population 
of studies or as much of the population as possible. Given the high volume 
of materials uncovered in preliminary tests of search terms that did not 
include the type of study we sought, the research team decided to develop 
a process to improve search efficiency without losing our ability to identify 
obscure publications.
2 The list of scholars known to use social network analysis in studies of drug 
trafficking groups includes: Gisela Bichler, Martin Bouchard, David Bright, 
Francesco Calderoni, Paolo Campana, Aili Malm, Carlo Morselli, and Man-
gai Natarajan.
3 The original terms to describe the research were: drug trafficking, organ-
ized crime groups, cartel, social network analysis, group structure, drug 
markets, co-offending networks, and illicit drug distribution.
4 This means that there were potentially 90 useful documents within a pool 
of 1560 items uncovered in the key word search.
We used EBSCO Host, JSTOR, Simon Fraser Uni-
versity’s Fast Search, and Google Scholar to search for 
sources. Each document was scanned against a set of 
inclusion criteria: the document must be published in 
English, with a scholarly outlet, after 1990, and contain 
social network analysis of at least one drug trafficking 
network using one or more recognized social network 
metric and/or analytic procedure. Moreover, the speci-
fied focus of the research had to be drug trafficking; arti-
cles looking at the overall structure of organized crime 
groups (e.g., Campana 2011; Varese 2011, 2012) were 
not included as all legitimate and multiple types of illicit 
activity were combined into a single network and our 
aim was to investigate only the portion of their opera-
tions involved in illicit drug trafficking. Each source 
appearing to satisfy the criteria based on a scan of the 
title, abstract and results was retained, and later read 
closely to confirm eligibility. Additionally, the research 
team examined the references of all sources for addi-
tional articles.
Figure  3 illustrates the screening process used to 
identify suitable studies. Thirty-four sources met the 
inclusion criteria (see reference section “Sources for sys-
tematic review”). Of note, many potential items were 
excluded due to a lack of network statistics: we were 
unable to include several important studies discussing 
the utility of SNA or theoretical concepts of interest to 
the study of dark networks (e.g., Kenney 2007; Spapens 
2010) and seminal inquiries into group structure using 
qualitative methods (e.g., Natarajan et  al. 2015; Soudijn 
2014; Spapens 2011), because they did not present actual 
network metrics.
Description of sources
Of the 34 studies identified, 76% were case studies; where 
41% focus on the workings of a particular group and 35% 
examine the distribution chain involving a central group 
but including all of their associations to other groups (see 
Table 2). About 18% of the studies investigated a popula-
tion of actors known to be involved in drug-related crim-
inal enterprise.5 Concerning geographic coverage, most 
research examined groups with central operations in 
North America or the Mediterranean. Notably, only one 
5 Research investigating a population of individuals known to be involved 
in drug trafficking typically involves a data mining process wherein the 
network generated includes everyone known to police. This often involves 
consolidating information from different data systems. From this point, 
selection criteria are applied to hone the file, i.e., for a co-offending rela-
tion to exist the individuals must be known to commit at least two crimes 
together. This contrasts with case study approaches, which define a group of 
individuals, usually by known membership or coactivity with known mem-
bers of a group.
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study sought to examine a global network (not reported 
in the Table 2). Collectively, most of these studies exam-
ine organized crime groups involved to some extent in 
the trafficking of cocaine. While we searched articles 
from 1990 to 2015, 71% of sources were published since 
2010. As reported in Table  2, most research aims to 
describe networks or explore research questions about 
the structure of the drug trafficking organization, using 
descriptive statistics or simple hypothesis tests. About 
79% of studies are cross-sectional, with data aggregated 
from police intelligence information. Publication venues 
tended to be peer review (82%) and only 21% of studies 
were funded.
Sample description
In this study, we originally intended to use the network as 
the primary unit of analysis instead of published studies.6 
The 34 sources identified describe 55 networks, some of 
6 As noted by one of the reviewers, in systematic reviews and meta-anal-
yses, there is a parallel distinction between using findings and studies. We 
argue that networks (i.e. reviews focused on research findings) are appropri-
ate because in much of the scientific literature, a single report will describe, 
and often systematically compare, the structure of multiple networks. This 
means that if the article were the unit of analysis, the research team would 
have to select one network for inclusion in the study. Choosing between 
networks leaves the current project open to the criticism that researcher 
bias tainted the selection process. Thus, the research team decided to use all 
networks described in each study. As the reader will learn shortly, a prob-
lem occurred forcing us to report on studies.
Table 1 Sample of results from the search term generation process
The average weight of search terms was 0.011735999 with a sample standard deviation of 0.016402695
Search terms Results Total hits for notables Weight
Search term development (identifying terms)
 Illicit drug distribution ~120,000 145 0.001208
 Cartel ~165,000 26 0.000158
 Drug trafficking networks ~525,000 127 0.000242
 SNA ~258,000 41 0.000159
 Organized crime groups ~1,250,000 185 0.000148
 Group structure ~5,990,000 215 3.58E−05
Modification of terms (building term sets)
 Co-offending drug network structure analysis ~960 80 0.083333
 Illicit drug network structure analysis trafficking ~30,800 143 0.004643
 Illicit drug network structure analysis ~67,800 143 0.002109
 Structure drug trafficking networks ~112,000 155 0.001384
 Network analysis drug trafficking ~200,000 161 0.000805
 Drug markets network structure analysis ~295,000 192 0.000651
Final terms chosen
 Illicit drug network structure analysis trafficking + ”network analysis” ~1560 90 0.057692
Selected search 
engines 
Screened by  
tle & abstract 
Items hing on 
all search terms 
Duplicates removed & 
references manually  
searched 
54 items 103 items 102 items 1,560 items 
10 usable 2 usable 15 usable 18 usable 
25 unique items found + 9 added from reference searches 
34 studies Final sample 
EBSCO Host JSTORE SFU’s Fast Search Google Scholar 
Fig. 3 Illustration of study identification process
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which are subnetworks based on different extractions. The 
meta-analytic database constructed for this study included
1. Details about the methods used and the network gen-
eration process (e.g., description of data source, a sam-
pling description, time frame, boundary specification,7 
type of drugs trafficked by the network, and the direc-
tionality and valuation of connections8);
2. descriptions of each network (e.g., total number of 
actors in the network, number of connections among 
them, density, number of components, as well as the 
average, standard deviation, and degree of centraliza-
tion for measures of actor positioning); and,
3. specifics about the analysis performed, i.e., whether 
the analysis was dynamic or cross-sectional, what tests 
were performed to answer stated research questions or 
hypotheses, and if they conducted a sensitivity analysis.
Much to our chagrin, there was little consistency in 
the information reported about each network, few com-
monalities exist in the analysis conducted, and stated 
research questions or hypotheses varied widely. For 
example, one of the most fundamental descriptive sta-
tistics to report about a network is density—the num-
ber of observed connections in the network relative to 
the number of links that could be present if all actors 
connected to each other. Descriptions of only 26 net-
works (48.1% of the networks discussed in the source 
articles) reported density. The simplest information, the 
number of actors and links present in the network, was 
more broadly reported, 85.2 and 53.7% respectively. This 
is not particularly encouraging given these details are 
equivalent to reporting the sample size in other research 
domains. Common descriptive statistics are even more 
elusive: only 12% of the studies report all standard 
descriptive statistics for each network (e.g., average and 
7 To build a network, it is essential to predefine who is eligible for inclusion 
in the “group”. This is an important decision in the research process as being 
overly restrictive or too broad may significantly alter the results.
8 Directed networks are such that the connections among actors have an 
inherent directionality because whatever is passing through the network (i.e., 
drugs, information, and money) flows from one person to another. Moreo-
ver, connections can be valued to indicate the amount of something passing 
between actors, the value of the exchange, or the strength of the relationship. 
Specifying these details about how the network was constructed is critical as 
it changes the way we interpret structural statistics.
Table 2 Publication details and  methods used in  the 34 
network studies on drug trafficking organizations
Description of methods Percent
Study focus
 Case study—group focus 41.2
 Case study—distribution chain 35.3
 Population/data mining 17.6
 Egonet distribution chain 2.9
 Multiple types 2.9
Coverage
 Canada or US 45.5
 Spain, Italy, or Greece 24.2
 Australia 12.1
 Colombia or Mexico 9.0
 UK or the Netherlands 9.0
Drug Market






 Independent (no formal designation) 38.2
 Mafia or cartel 23.5
 Assorted (mixed) 23.5
 Street gang 8.9





 Exploring research questions 47.1
 Descriptive 35.3
 Testing formal hypotheses 11.8
 Disruption simulation/assessment 5.9
Level of statistical analysis
 Low (descriptive only) 47.1
 Medium (e.g., simple hypotheses tests) 41.2
 High (e.g., advanced simulation, multivariate analysis) 11.8
Analytic framework
 Cross-sectional analysis 79.4
 Dynamic analysis 20.6
Primary data source
 Police intelligence/investigative files 76.5
 Court records/transcripts of evidence 14.7
 Books (investigative journalism, auto-biography) 5.9
 Customs seizures 2.9
Funding
 None specified 79.4
 Federal grant 11.8




 Peer review journal article 82.4
 Chapter 14.7
 Conference paper 2.9
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standard deviation for degree centrality, density, average 
path length, and number of actors and links) and 24% of 
articles report standardized values, required to directly 
compare different networks. Moreover, studies ranged in 
methodologies from descriptive core analysis (e.g., study 
Bouchard and Konarski 2014) to regression models (e.g., 
study Grund and Densley 2012) to simulation experi-
ments (e.g., study Duijn et al. 2014). Not all is lost, how-
ever, as two critical themes emerged from our inspection 
of network-based studies of organized crime structure; 
in the results section that follows, we discuss the crimi-
nal network structure, specifically the trade-off between 
efficiency and security, and the relative importance of 
human capital versus social capital.
Results
Criminal network structure
Our first set of research questions examine whether the 
SNA literature finds specific network structures common 
to drug trafficking organizations; if there are differences 
between group structures and market structures; and, 
whether these structural patterns offer strategic implica-
tions to aid crime control efforts aimed at disrupting the 
illicit drug trade. Of the 34 studies included in this review, 
14 examine operational structure in detail (see Table  3) 
and characterize the research objective as exploring the 
efficiency and security trade-off.9 Networks engaging in 
illicit activity have to balance the need for efficient busi-
ness connections and communication with security and 
secrecy (Baker and Faulkner 1993; study Morselli et  al. 
2007). Theoretically, this balance is not as important in 
legitimate, conventional networks (study Duijn et  al. 
2014). This trade-off might account for operational struc-
tures described in qualitative research—the preponder-
ance of loosely structured networks of entrepreneurs.
Across the 15 networks described in these 14 studies, 
the statistics used fall under two broad categories—cen-
trality and embedding. Centrality measures are margin-
ally more common. Specifically, eight out of 14 (57%) 
studies used both degree and betweenness centrality, and 
9 Seven other studies (studies Berlusconi 2013; Boivin 2014; Bouchard 
and Konarski 2014; Calderoni and Piccardi 2014; Canter 2004; Grund and 
Densley 2012; Hutchins and Benham-Hutchins 2010; Salazar and Restrepo 
2011) examine network structure and employ centrality and embeddedness 
measures, however, significant divergence in research aim and theoretical 
framework prohibit their inclusion here. With this said, results are included 
in this section where appropriate, in the text or as a footnote. Of interest to 
the reader, only one study (study Canter 2004) attempts to use six indices of 
organizational structure to generate a typology of criminal organizations. 
This study finds a range of structure from very loose networks with no cen-
tral figures to highly structured operations. Two factors account for this vari-
ation—size of the group and centrality of leadership. Canter (study Canter 
2004) concludes that there are three types of criminal organizations—ad hoc 
groups, oligarchies, and organized criminals, the former exhibiting the small-
est group size and the latter being the largest.
three studies used closeness centrality. Degree centrality 
is the count of ties attached to a given individual (Free-
man 1979). Individuals with high degree centrality have 
more connections. Betweenness centrality is the number 
of times that an individual sits along the shortest path 
between all others in the network (Freeman 1979), and 
represents the extent that an individual mediates connec-
tions and information. Closeness centrality assesses the 
ability of an actor to communicate along the shortest path 
to all others in the network (Freeman 1979). Irrespective 
of the type of centrality, when networks exhibit lower 
overall centralization, it means that a smaller portion of 
the network is dependent on a single actor. Notably, this 
structural dependence does not necessarily suggest hier-
archical control: centralization would only be interpreted 
as reflecting hierarchical organization if the direction of 
actor connections indicated chain of command. Over-
all, the studies show that drug trafficking networks have 
higher centralization than conventional networks (study 
Calderoni et al. 2014), simulated networks (study Malm 
and Bichler 2011), and terrorist organizations (studies: 
Morselli et al. 2007; Xu and Chen 2008). The studies also 
show that centralization increases with the threat of law 
enforcement targeting (Morselli and Petit 2007).
Six out of 14 studies (43%) reported embedding meas-
ures. Statistics measuring how individuals are embedded 
in larger social structures include density, path length, 
clustering, efficiency, and transitivity.10 Embedding 
measures are tools that allow social network analysts to 
contextualize and understand the entire population and 
how network structure constrains or enables actors in the 
network. Of note, only two studies combined centrality 
and embedding statistics to explain the security and effi-
ciency trade-off (studies: Calderoni et  al. 2014; Morselli 
et al. 2007). Overall, the studies show that individuals in 
drug trafficking networks are more embedded than con-
ventional networks, and less embedded than terrorist 
organizations, as indicated by lower path length and clus-
tering coefficients (studies: Mainas 2012; Morselli et  al. 
2007; Xu and Chen 2008).
A group’s objectives and operational tempo appear to 
moderate its network structure. Networks whose pri-
mary purpose is to make money tend to favor efficiency 
(greater density), while networks with more ideological 
10 Path length refers to the average geodesic distance (average length of the 
shortest paths) linking each pair of people in the network; the clustering 
coefficient captures the extend of clumping (areas of high and low density) 
in the network; efficiency is a standardized metric (controlling for net-
work size) that captures the non-redundant nature of an individual’s con-
nections, meaning that they have ties to unique clusters of people that do 
not otherwise connect; and, transitivity refers to the occurrence of triadic 
configurations (sets of three people all connected to each other) relative 
to intransitive structures (groups of three where there are only two links 
among actors).
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goals or a longer time to act favor sparseness with fewer 
central actors (studies: Bright and Delaney 2013; Morselli 
et al. 2007): this finding generally concurs with Dorn and 
colleagues (2005). Overall, the studies included in this 
review show that drug trafficking network structure 
appears to be lower in centralization and density than 
both legitimate networks (studies: Calderoni et al. 2014; 
Duijn et  al. 2014; Malm et  al. 2010) and general co-
offending networks (study Duijn et  al. 2014), and more 
centralized and dense than terrorist networks (studies: 
Mainas 2012; Morselli et al. 2007; Xu and Chen 2008).11
Only two of the studies looked at change in organiza-
tional structure over time and both used descriptive statis-
tics; none incorporated dynamic simulation-based models 
such as exponential random graph models (ERGM). Bright 
and Delaney (2013) found that as a drug network’s profit 
orientation increases, the structure centralizes and changes 
from one favoring security to efficiency. They also show 
that a shift in roles and increase in size favors efficiency 
over security (study Bright and Delaney 2013). Morselli and 
Petit (2007) investigated how law enforcement targeting 
effects the efficiency and security trade-off (study Morselli 
and Petit 2007). They concluded that as law enforcement 
targeting and seizures increase, network structure central-
izes (density increases) to become more secure.
Eight of the studies assessed the network position of 
group leaders (studies: Calderoni 2014; Calderoni et  al. 
2014; Duijn et al. 2014; Hofmann and Gallupe 2015; Malm 
et al. 2008; Morselli 2009, 2010; Xu and Chen 2008).12 The 
11 One study explored internal co-offending (study 16), finding that mem-
bers of an ethnically diverse, but racially homogeneous street gang were 
more likely to co-offend with other gang members from the same ethnic 
group, suggesting the existence of distinct internal co-offending structures.
12 Notably, several other studies examined group leaders, albeit from different 
perspectives. For instance, two studies used centrality statistics to help uncover 
core-periphery structures (studies Baker and Faulkner 1993; Borgatti and Ever-
ett 1992)—this perspective argues that within each network a cluster of core 
actors dominate, and accrue the most benefit, from the network. Adopting 
a world-system perspective, Boivin (study Boivin 2014) examined the rela-
tive position of nations within global drug distribution, comparing cocaine, 
heroin, and marijuana markets to legitimate trade relations. He found dis-
tinct clustering of core nations and greater centralization in cocaine distribu-
tion than marijuana. All networks were significantly less dense than legitimate 
trade networks. Bouchard and Konarski (study Bouchard and Konarski 2014) 
examined whether a small set of targeted gang members were in fact central 
to the co-offending network and part of a core group of members; however, 
only 4 of the 6 most central individuals in the core group were identified by law 
enforcement. Another set of studies concluded that the central figures in drug 
markets and groups could be identified using SNA techniques with networks 
generated from law enforcement and surveillance data (studies Berlusconi 
2013; Hutchins and Benham-Hutchins 2010). Notably, Berlusconi (study 1) 
found that degree and betweenness centrality are robust in identifying key 
players under conditions of missing data; and, Hutchins and Benham-Hutchins 
(study Hutchins and Benham-Hutchins 2010) suggest that SNA data mining 
techniques offer efficient methods for identifying distinct clusters despite low 
network density and that a small number of highly central brokers (between-
ness centrality) are visible. As these studies were not explicitly aiming to exam-
ine structure from a security and efficiency perspective they are not included 
in Table 3.
rationale for this focus is that leaders of groups who favor 
security will seek to protect themselves from the gaze of 
law enforcement by distancing themselves from others in 
the group. The results of this research are also mixed. The 
majority of the studies show that group leaders have both 
high betweenness and degree centrality, suggesting that 
they are central actors (studies: Calderoni 2014; Calderoni 
et al. 2014; Duijn et al. 2014; Hofmann and Gallupe 2015; 
Tenti and Morselli 2014); however, Morselli (2009, 2010) 
found that leaders were peripheral to the core of group 
communication. Incorporating geographic distance with 
social network metrics, Malm et al. (2008) found that lead-
ers were central in the network, but distanced themselves 
geographically from drug production sites (study Malm 
et al. 2008).
As mentioned at the outset of this article, it is impor-
tant to determine the structural differences of groups 
operating within the drug market and the market itself. 
The majority of the studies focused on market structure, 
including groups and individuals occupying different 
niches (studies: Calderoni 2014; Calderoni et  al. 2014; 
Mainas 2012; Malm and Bichler 2011; Morselli 2009, 
2010; Morselli and Petit 2007; Tenti and Morselli 2014). 
Only a few studies focused specifically on groups (stud-
ies: Bright and Delaney 2013; Hofmann and Gallupe 
2015; Morselli et al. 2007; Xu and Chen 2008). The find-
ings indicate little difference between market and group 
structure. The articles reviewed unanimously show that 
both groups and networks operating within a drug mar-
ket expand outward from a core in short chain-like 
structures, rather than from multiple cells (studies: Cal-
deroni et al. 2014; Duijn et al. 2014; Mainas 2012; Malm 
and Bichler 2011; Natarajan 2000; Tenti and Morselli 
2014; Xu and Chen 2008). These results also confirm 
that drug markets conform to small-world properties,13 
where communication can reach every member of the 
group with a relatively small number of intermediaries, 
and network structures are relatively sparse (studies: 
Mainas 2012; Malm and Bichler 2011; Morselli and Petit 
2007; Salazar and Restrepo 2011; Xu and Chen 2008). 
Generally, these findings are consistent with the results 
of qualitative research. It follows that law enforcement 
13 Networks exhibit small world properties when “global” connectiv-
ity patterns generate networks wherein all actors connect to each other 
through relatively short chains—typically, six or fewer segments con-
nect all actors in the network (e.g., Granovetter 2003; Watts and Strogatz 
1998). Illustrating this point with an examination of a Colombian drug 
trafficking network—Cartel del Norte del Valle—Salazar and Restrepo 
(study 32) document that the average distance between any pair of mem-
bers was 3.7, in part due to high levels of betweenness. They also found 
that information shocks, search for threatening nodes, and ultimately, 
lethal violence flowed through the network in clusters. US policy and 
major interdiction efforts over the course of 15 years resulted in a decline 
of centrality and network size, which corresponds with a lengthening of 
average distance among members from 3.7 to 4.6.
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efforts to disrupt illicit drug trafficking should consider 
the structure of the target network when developing 
strategies (e.g., study Malm et  al. 2010); however, it is 
important to be cognizant that their targeting may 
affect network structure (e.g., study Morselli and Petit 
2007).
There is however, a caveat to these findings. There is 
little consistency in the examined research as to how 
structural characteristics reflect the concepts of effi-
ciency and security. One group of research finds that 
high centralization (usually coinciding with lower den-
sity) reflects more efficient and less secure networks 
(studies: Bright and Delaney 2013; Calderoni et al. 2014; 
Mainas 2012; Malm and Bichler 2011; Morselli et  al. 
2007). The other group suggests that decreased centrali-
zation (increased density) reveals more efficiency and 
less security (studies: Duijn et  al. 2014; Morselli 2010; 
Morselli and Petit 2007; Salazar and Restrepo 2011). The 
research focus is one possible source for this contradic-
tion. The former group investigates the natural evolution 
of drug trafficking groups or compares drug trafficking 
groups to other groups with notably different objectives 
and frequency of action; whereas, much of the latter 
group investigates changing network structure due to 
increased enforcement activity. Thus, while we see some 
consistency in the metrics used to describe drug traffick-
ing networks, researchers need to consider the context 
of networks when applying theory and drawing theoreti-
cal conclusions.
Relative importance of social capital versus human capital
Individuals positioned with ties to unique clusters of peo-
ple have greater social capital (Burt 1992, 1997); however, 
if we factor for individual attributes and resources, we 
may find that the role a person plays in the drug distribu-
tion process is more telling. Thus, our second focal area is 
to examine role differentiation and to determine whether 
the existing SNA literature reveals something about the 
relative importance of social capital (position within the 
network) and human capital (access to unique resources 
and skills) when we attempt to identify critical actors or 
groups within an illicit drug market. In examining this 
issue, we ask whether efforts to disrupt market activity 
gain an advantage by considering these factors. Of the 34 
studies looking into the organizational structure of illicit 
drug trade, 12 examine the social capital of individuals 
involved in drug market activity by the resources pos-
sessed or role they play within a specific group’s 
operation or across a drug distribution chain.14 Across 
the 16 networks described, two SNA metrics are com-
monly used to assess social capital—degree and between-
ness centrality.15 The attributes used to reflect human 
capital are typically associated with operational roles 
(reported for 87.5% of the observed networks) or status 
and/or rank within the group (50% of the observed net-
works). Only two studies specifically investigate human 
capital using actor attributes associated with access to 
resources and involvement in specific activities.
Operational roles
While each author used a different set of operational 
roles to classify drug market participants, evidence is 
beginning to emerge to suggest that traffickers, those 
involved in smuggling or organizing shipping consign-
ments, have higher social capital than individuals or 
groups involved in other roles, for example:
 – Examining two case studies, Calderoni (2012, 2014) 
observed higher average degree and betweenness cen-
trality, but lower clustering coefficients for individu-
als involved in finding drugs abroad and importing to 
Italy.
  – Investigating all known drug groups working in West-
ern Canada (British Columbia and the Yukon Ter-
ritory), Malm and Bichler (2011) considered simple 
involvement (single niche of activity) versus complex 
activity (participation in two or more operational 
roles), finding that the people involved in complex 
transport and complex supply had higher average 
degree and betweenness centrality scores and low clus-
tering coefficients (study Malm and Bichler 2011).
14 To be included in this analysis, the study must report average scores 
by role using a graphic or statistic. Notably, we excluded three important 
studies for this reason. (1) Coding communications about illicit activity for 
a group of 294 individuals involved in heroin dealing in New York City in 
the 1990s, Natarajan (2000) maps the organizational structure by role, but 
does not provide average metrics, nor does she specifically investigate social 
capital (study Natarajan 2000). (2) Natarajan (2006) examines social power 
using Bonacichi’s power analysis and only reports mean power scores for 
core members (a group of 38 individuals critical to heroin trafficking) that 
include sellers, retailers, brokers, and secretaries (study Natarajan 2006) 
and did not report power scores by role. (3) Garay-Salamanca and Salcedo-
Albarán (2012) looked at the social capital of key leaders; however, they did 
not examine the position or human capital of other members of the three 
networks investigated.
15 This widespread use of general centrality measures is a bit surprising 
given that the originators of social capital theory suggested other metrics to 
operationalize this concept. For more information about a set of alternative 
measures of social capital, see Burt (1992, 1997).
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 – Studying four mid-level criminal organizations operat-
ing in the Spanish cocaine market, Framis (2014) dis-
covered that within each group someone involved with 
importing/transporting was most central to operations 
(study Framis 2014).
Notably, only one study explored the social capital of 
one smuggler throughout their career. Morselli (2001) 
found that while the network structure varied, at no time 
was it a hierarchical drug trafficking organization (study 
Morselli 2001). Arguably, at the most successful period 
of his trafficking career, the central figure of this network 
(Mr. Nice) exhibited his greatest level of social capital: 
highest level of efficiency and lowest effect size—two 
measures of social capital suggested by Burt (1992, 1997). 
Interestingly, consignments were of medium size (averag-
ing about 3 kg) and showed little fluctuation.
Examining group structure and between group crime 
activities for 9 groups of co-offenders involved in Italian 
the cocaine market, Tenti and Morselli (2014) discovered 
that groups occupying the same niche in the drug distri-
bution chain exhibited variation in structure (study Tenti 
and Morselli 2014). Moreover, highly central individuals 
were located a different levels of drug distribution; highly 
central people did not concentrate in a particular role 
within the industry. Since the configuration of groups 
varied, so too, did the network resilience among groups. 
With many partnership agreements approximating a 
resource-sharing organizational model, the chain-like 
structure of the network exhibited low density with inter-
acting clusters (subsets) of people.
Only two studies specifically investigate the relative 
importance of money laundering. Malm and Bichler (2013) 
find that self-launderers who were also involved in smug-
gling or supply were the most highly ranked brokers in the 
network: this is indicative of higher social capital (study 
Malm and Bichler 2013). Moreover, there were considera-
bly more self-launders found in the network of co-offenders 
(82/102 or 80%) suggesting that with recent technological 
developments in the financial sector (i.e., hawala banking, 
bitcoins, person-to-person transfers) money laundering 
is “de-professionalizing.” Morselli and Giguere (2006) add 
that drug distribution networks include influential par-
ticipants who appear to work in legitimate occupational 
settings; of these individuals, those involved in financial 
activities are critical seeds, introducing others to the net-
work. The authors conclude that these seeds are likely to 
hold the key to understanding the opportunity structure of 
criminal enterprise (study Morselli and Giguere 2006).
Access to resources/specialized skills
Few studies directly examine the relative importance of 
human capital (access to resources and specialized skills) 
in comparison to social capital. In a series of studies 
examining the operations of a methamphetamine traf-
ficking group working out of Australia, Bright and col-
leagues (studies: Bright et al. 2012, 2014a, b, Bright and 
Delaney 2013) demonstrate the high correlation between 
human capital and social capital, where the human capi-
tal measure captured a range of tangible and intangible 
resources. Investigating the market disruption potential 
of using social and human capital to identify targets for 
law enforcement action these authors find that degree 
targeting (individuals with the highest degree centrality) 
and a mixed identification strategy incorporating human 
capital and social capital perform the best as gauged by 
facilitating the greatest reduction in the size of the largest 
component (group of connected individuals) and maxi-
mum disruption of market functionality (study Bright 
et  al. 2014b). These authors, however, caution that law 
enforcement strategies must remain flexible because 
people transit in and out of networks causing centrality 
scores to fluctuate over time (study Bright and Delaney 
2013). A point well supported by Duijn et al. (2014).
Testing the simulated effectiveness of a wider range 
of targeting tactics, Duijn et al. (2014) show that several 
strategies have the potential to disrupt the Dutch mari-
juana industry (study Duijn et al. 2014). Comparing five 
disruption strategies (e.g., random, human capital, degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, and human capital and 
degree centrality) and three recovery mechanisms (e.g., 
random, preference by social distance or degree central-
ity), networks were found to exhibit greater density, and 
thus more resiliency, after attacks targeting those with 
the most human capital. Moreover, individuals playing 
instrumental roles were more vulnerable (e.g., coordi-
nators and international traders). These authors assert 
that disruption strategies must be long term efforts as 
networks recover to attack in such a manner that they 




This study sought to synthesize what we know about the 
structure of drug trafficking organizations as revealed 
by SNA scholarship. We reason that qualitative research 
involving conventional analytic techniques is invalu-
able to developing ideas about the structure of criminal 
enterprise, and that to build on this body of work we 
must apply SNA metrics. By applying SNA metrics, we 
can standardize how we describe network structures 
thereby supporting cross-study comparisons about the 
relative positional importance of people and groups. In 
doing so, SNA-based research offers a strategy to validate 
hypotheses in a way that provides direct crime control 
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implications. While still in a preliminary stage of devel-
opment, five implications emerge from this systematic 
examination of the body of SNA research in this area.
1. Drug trafficking networks are more apt to be sparse 
with central individuals connecting the group and 
linking between different groups suggesting an 
operational preference for security. This result sug-
gests that targeting central individuals may fragment 
the network (e.g., study Duijn et  al. 2014); however, 
results also suggest there may be a number of indi-
viduals waiting to replace central figures. Police need 
to recognize that increased law enforcement atten-
tion will cause the organization to adapt and become 
more decentralized, thus more difficult to target spe-
cific individuals (e.g., study Morselli and Petit 2007). 
Disruption is a long-term strategy (e.g., studies: 
Bright et al. 2012, 2014a, b, Bright and Delaney 2013, 
Duijn et al. 2014).
2. Leaders of drug trafficking networks and those with 
important roles are identifiable through central-
ity analysis, if there is sufficient information about 
group connections (e.g., studies Calderoni et al. 2014; 
Duijn et al. 2014). Notably, missing or dated informa-
tion can obscure central actors. Thus, efforts to map 
criminal networks should regularly extend beyond 
criminal justice sources to include current affilia-
tions, family connections, and legitimate business 
relations to ensure the most important actors in the 
group are correctly identified.
3. Use a range of metrics and analytic techniques to 
identify central players to target, i.e., spectral embed-
ding (study Calderoni et  al. 2014), attributes/roles 
(studies Bright et al. 2014a, b), meeting participation 
and communication style (studies: Calderoni 2012; 
Calderoni 2014), and legitimate connections (study 
Morselli and Giguere 2006). There are many central-
ity statistics, each tapping a different aspect of social 
structure, when combined with decisions about 
actors and which relations to code, this creates a ver-
satile tool kit through which to understand group 
structure. Examining the structure from different 
perspectives will better expose network vulnerabili-
ties.
4. While disruption efforts will vary in effect, degree 
targeting or degree/human capital strategy performs 
best. Removing well-positioned and well-resourced 
actors from the trade network should split the net-
work into smaller components and maximize the 
potential disruption of market activity (study Bright 
et al. 2014b). While it is possible to trigger cascading 
failure with targeted progressive attacks on bridges 
(study Xu and Chen 2008), the success of crime con-
trol policy will depend on the drug market niche that 
the targeted individual occupies and the complexity 
of their drug market involvement (study Malm and 
Bichler 2011). Analysts are advised to identify central 
actors for each market niche.
5. Map networks repeatedly (over time). Anti-crime 
strategies need to be flexible as networks continu-
ally evolve; attacks on the network, from within due 
to conflict and launched externally by the criminal 
justice system, lead to structural evolution. Actors 
change, centrality scores fluctuate, and roles/attrib-
utes adjust (e.g., study Bright and Delaney 2013). 
Targeting individuals for removal from the network 
based on human capital stands to increase network 
density, exposing more of the network as replace-
ment people often create new paths and shortcuts, 
which raises the efficiency, and inherent resiliency, 
of the network (e.g., study Duijn et  al. 2014). Thus, 
old network maps are useful as benchmarks against 
which to assess the efforts of disruption tactics.
At this point, we draw the readers’ attention to the 
methodological shortcomings associated with studying 
drug trafficking networks.
Research limitations
Due to three methodological shortcomings, the findings 
reported above are of limited generalizability. First, as 
reported in Tables  3 and 4, this body of work primarily 
uses evidence presented in court or information 
extracted from police data (intelligence, investigations, or 
co-arrests). As most researchers using juridical materials 
to glean network information from electronic surveil-
lance generated during the investigation, police informa-
tion is the principal data source.16 Only one study (study 
Morselli 2001), explores a network built from an autobi-
ography supplemented with investigatory (DEA elec-
tronic surveillance) and news reports. This overreliance 
on data from the criminal justice system means that we 
must acknowledge that the efficiency and security trade-
off and the intersection between human and social capi-
tal may be different among groups involved in illicit drug 
trade that do not come to the attention of law 
16 Several authors, Varese and Campana (Campana 2011, Campana and 
Varese 2012, Varese 2011, 2012), Natarajan (studies: Natarajan 2000, 2006), 
and Calderoni (Calderoni et  al. 2014, 2015, and studies: Calderoni 2012, 
2014) to name a few, aptly demonstrate the utility of using police data, par-
ticularly information gleaned from wiretaps. Berlusconi (2013) supports this 
research and concludes that structural measures are robust when the data 
come from a purposive sample of all wiretaps among all criminal network 
members (study Berlusconi 2013). However, reliance on a single source or 
type of law enforcement data raises important methodological concerns, 
namely self-censorship, coverage gaps, unknown network boundaries, lim-
ited sample sizes, biased samples, and potential incongruence between the 
content of the conversation and subsequent action (Varese 2012).
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enforcement. Moreover, observed networks may be 
incomplete, as some actors involved may remain uniden-
tified or mislabeled as being unimportant in the drug 
trade.
Second, the search strategy used in this systematic 
review was limited to articles written in English, accessi-
ble through a scholarly outlet, and published since 1990. 
Therefore, it is quite possible that relevant studies were 
missed. In this vein, most of these studies examine mar-
kets based in Western, consumer nations with extensive 
coastlines, few shared land borders, and pivotal positions 
in world trade based on port/shipping activity.17 When 
considered in tandem with the reliance on law enforce-
ment data as discussed above, it is not surprising that the 
investigatory focus of most of these studies is on groups 
importing or distributing cocaine and other illicit drugs 
produced externally. Notable exceptions being Duijn and 
colleagues (study Duijn et al. 2014) who studied cannabis 
cultivation in the Netherlands and the research group led 
by David Bright (studies: Bright et  al. 2014a, b; Bright 
et al. 2012) who investigated the methamphetamine trade 
in Australia. Being situated as an entrepôrt may affect the 
capital, human and social, associated with individuals 
involved in smuggling or transportation roles. Moreover, 
this context may also unduly accentuate the central posi-
tioning of individuals found to be involved in smuggling 
activity. Had researchers undertaken similar studies in 
countries with less exposure to the currents of global 
trade, the organizational structures observed may be 
considerably different.
The third methodological issue to acknowledge is that 
most of the observed networks (76%) were case stud-
ies—43% focused on a specific group and 33% mapped a 
distribution chain. This disproportional inclusion of pur-
posively selected case studies, chosen in part due to data 
availability, leads us to conclude that it is premature to 
suggest that these findings apply to all groups involved in 
illicit drug trade. With more egocentric and population-
based research, we will be better equipped to assess the 
generalizability of these case studies.
Advancing the field
Synthesizing prior research through meta-analyses and 
systematic reviews is a critical exercise in the advance-
ment of scientific inquiry. Notably, the nascent stage of 
SNA research in crime science hampered our attempt 
to synthesize what we know about the organizational 
structure of illicit drug trade. Reported results were pri-
marily descriptive rather than explanatory, and there 
17 Boivin (2014) is a notable exception: His research used drug seizure 
information for 194 countries reported to the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) by organizations tasked with monitoring and 
controlling drug trafficking (study Boivin 2014).
was a marked lack of consistency in reporting stand-
ards and methods. Moving forward, in order to facili-
tate cross-case comparison, replication, and rigorous 
meta-analyses, we suggest that research using social net-
work analysis should incorporate the following reporting 
standards.
1. Researchers and analysts must clearly describe how 
they generated the networks. Network generation 
involves making decisions about what constitutes a 
link between actors and where to obtain information 
about these connections, as well as whether the rela-
tions have an inherent value or directionality. Thus, 
a clear statement is needed to alert the reader as to 
what constitutes a tie, the different types of ties (if 
appropriate), whether ties were valued (or binary), 
and whether the network was directed (or symmetri-
cal). After generating the initial network, research-
ers often extract a subsample for analysis (i.e., prin-
cipal component). A clear explanation of subsample 
extraction is necessary. It is important to provide 
these details as decisions made here, may radically 
influence the results. Even though editorial prefer-
ences will relegate some of these details into foot-
notes, it is important not to cut this information in 
the final edits. This information reveals how method-
ological decision-making influences the results and 
helps to promote replication.
2. Structural differences among groups are often associ-
ated with how individuals are connected; thus, inves-
tigations must be specific about what constitutes a 
connection between people (or groups). This means 
that we should invest more effort into uncovering 
what the important binding mechanisms are and 
what advantages different types of bonds have for 
drug trafficking operations (study Malm et al. 2010), 
i.e., brokers who do not use violence are more trusted 
and deeply connected than brokers who do (study 
Morselli 2001), and family/kinship relations are used 
for money-laundering and these connections are dif-
ficult to sever (studies: Hofmann and Gallupe 2015; 
Malm and Bichler 2013).
3. Researchers and analysts must describe sampling pro-
cedures and how they determined network bounda-
ries. SNA research uses many different sampling 
strategies, including hybridized techniques using 
multiple procedures. Even within research using a 
case-study approach, focal individuals referred to as 
seeds, are often selected as the starting point around 
which a network is generated. Using selection crite-
ria, we add individuals to the network based on some 
type of association with the seed individuals. While 
most authors often provide this information, they do 
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not always explain where the network stops—the net-
work boundary. Conceivably, one could continue for 
several steps out from a focal individual, i.e., should 
the friend of a friend of a friend still part of the same 
group. A pre-determined network boundary should 
be established and reported. Without these details, 
replication and cross-study comparison is limited.
4. Irrespective of the stated research objectives, we must 
report a set of basic descriptive statistics. Due to the 
novelty of SNA research in criminology, authors tend 
to devote attention to explaining the metrics used to 
answer research questions. There are a set of descrip-
tive statistics, however, that provide a framework for 
understanding structure. Basic descriptive statistics 
to report include: the number of nodes and links, 
density, number of components, average path length, 
average degree, and degree centralization for each 
network under examination. If a subset is drawn, 
then two sets of values may be necessary—descrip-
tive statistics for the full network and descriptive sta-
tistics for the subset. The scientific method stipulates 
that basic descriptive statistics are required when 
reporting results; SNA is not exempt from this foun-
dational tenet.
5. We need to report standardized values for all metrics 
used to test hypotheses or answer research questions. 
Network size influences many statistics, and as such, 
statisticians have developed standardized versions 
of the key metrics, referred to as normalized values. 
While raw values have an inherent interpretabil-
ity, and as such, are widely preferred, study results 
should also include normalized values where possi-
ble (i.e., standardized centrality measures). Reporting 
normalized values will enable meta-analyses that will 
advance this field of research.
6. With such a rich body of existing research, replica-
tion should take precedence. In what was likely an 
endeavor to explore the breadth of SNA methods and 
techniques, scholars in this field examined networks 
in a variety of ways. Now, the focus can shift to repli-
cation, to see if different networks share similar prop-
erties when the same analytics are applied. To this 
end, research collaborations among scholars working 
in different nations might help to foster more replica-
tion and cross-network comparison.
7. It is important to construct titles, select keywords, and 
write abstracts using standard terms and phrases to 
ensure that related research is identified, irrespective 
of search engine used. In this study, we found 26% of 
the source articles by reading articles and examin-
ing the references listed. Moreover, we had high false 
positives: wading through hundreds of documents to 
find a handful of appropriate items is not efficient. 
Including standard terms and phrases would improve 
the research process twofold. First, it will decrease 
the likelihood of missing important studies when 
conducting a literature review; and second, standard-
ized language will improve the efficiency of source 
identification during meta-analyses and systematic 
reviews.
Conclusions
Despite the early stage of SNA research in crime sci-
ence, there are reasons to be optimistic. Data sharing 
and research collaborations that seek to compare crim-
inal networks are forming. These partnerships often 
include an international group of scholars who facili-
tate cross-country network comparisons and a sharing 
of expertise (i.e., the University of New South Wales 
Criminal Networks Research Group http://www.cnrg.
unsw.edu.au/). Notably, the Illicit Networks Work-
shop, a working group dedicated to the advancement 
of a networked criminology, is currently in its eighth 
year of bringing together scholars from across the 
world to share ideas and research (Malm and Bichler 
2015).
Research funding opportunities for social network 
research in criminal justice are also emerging. For exam-
ple, the Violence Reduction Initiative has held webinars 
bringing together practitioners and academics to educate 
and share experiences in using SNA for crime reduction. 
Additionally, the National Institute of Justice has solicited 
research proposals for the application of SNA to reduce 
violent crime and increase predictive policing capabili-
ties. We encourage more funding agencies to support 
research specifically focused on the application of SNA to 
criminal networks.
In conclusion, while we were limited in our analyses 
by the lack of standardized reporting and methods used 
over the 34 studies we reviewed, this systematic review 
still enables us to answer our three research questions 
and greatly contributes to the field of organized crime 
and drug research. The studies included in this review 
enable us to assert with confidence that drug trafficking 
networks tend to spread from a relatively dense core in 
short chain-like structures. The studies also show that 
these structures are apparent across the drug distribution 
system. Disruption strategies targeting individuals with 
high centrality and human capital are likely to include the 
leaders and other visible members of the drug distribu-
tion network, and this should, lead to a more successful 
crime control.
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